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. Neither economists nor p o lit ic a l  
scientists can answer the crucial economic and 
p o lit ic a l questions about the consequences of 
revenue sharing."
Henry Aaron
"Honest C itizen 's  Guide 
to Revenue Sharing," in 
Proceedings of the 1971 
Meeting of the National 
Tax Association
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INTRODUCTION
A federal system of government is an association of two or more 
states that desire union without actually  surrendering th e ir  individual 
id e n t it ie s .  The federating states are heterogenous units in that they 
d if fe r  in one or more o f the following: climate, physical features,
state of economic development, population, language and, sometimes, 
customs, ins titu tions and re lig ion . However, the degree of heterogene­
i ty  varies from one federation to another.
Federal finance involves a threefold division of resources between 
the central government, the regional or state authorities , and the local 
governments. Hence, the study of federal finance includes the re la ­
tionship between those three levels of government. Moreover, the estab­
lishment of a federation raises three problems: (a) how to allocate func­
tions ra tio n a lly ;  (2) how to allocate taxing powers; and (3) how to 
share revenue between the governments of that federation.
Revenue sharing among the regions/states in the Federal Republic o f  
Nigeria--the focus o f this paper—has been a thorny issue in the p o lit ic a l  
and economic development of the country. Revenue sharing policies have 
been used to ju s t i fy  the unequal d istribution  of power existing between 
the regions, and many observers have suggested that conflic t over revenue 
sharing decisions might have been a major contributing factor in the 
development o f the c iv i l  war: 1966-1970. In addition, there is no doubt 
that those who advocate creation of more states look at revenue sharing 
as a system that ought to favor th e ir  cause by directing more revenue to 
th e ir  individual constituencies.
1
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the process of revenue 
sharing in the Nigerian federation and to propose recommendations on how 
to improve the system. In order to f u l f i l l  this purpose» the paper w il l  
review the experiences o f the various commissions involved with the 
development of revenue sharing schemes, consider many of the c r i te r ia  
used in the allocation process, and present a broad analysis of the con­
troversy on the revenue allocation system in Nigeria.
Methodology and Sources
For sources of data and information, primary reliance w il l  be placed 
upon Nigerian public documents and important published secondary sources. 
Additionally, the author was able to v is i t  Nigeria and interviewed a 
number of public o f f ic ia ls ,  notably the Federal Director of Budget and 
the Chairman of the 1977 Commission, on revenue allocation.
Most of the facts on the a c t iv i t ie s  of the commissions set up to 
find workable and lasting solutions to the issue of revenue sharing are 
extracted from books written on Nigerial Federal (Public) Finance by Drs. 
A. Adedeji and P. Okigbo. Data on the c r i te r ia  fo r allocation and 
increased financial power of the federal government are drawn from the 
reports of the 1980 Presidential Commission on revenue a llocation , works 
edited by Panter-Brick t i t l e d ,  "Soldier and O il: The P o lit ica l Trans­
formation of N igeria," and Omorogiuwa's "Nigeria: The Effect of State 
Creation on Revenue Allocation and Economic Development." Information on 
to ta l revenue shared and the method of sharing comes from other govern­
mental publications as well as from books and periodicals written on the 
subject.
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Organization of the Study
This study is divided into f ive  chapters. Chapter I is a review 
of the works of the revenue sharing commissions between 1946 and 1980. 
Chapter I I  describes the c r i te r ia  used in the allocation system, past 
and present. Chapter I I I  discusses the increased centralization of f i s ­
cal power in the federal hands and the effects of such centra lization .
Both Chapters I and I I  provide the background information that helped 
flesh-out reasons why the revenue sharing issue is a problematic one, 
which is the subject of Chapter IV. Chapter I I I  depicts the shrinkage of 
independent revenue sources of state governments and the state governments 
increasing dependence on federal sources, which also creates the basis 
for the conclusions arrived at in Chapter IV. The paper's f ina l conclu­
sion is contained in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER I
Nigeria: Revenue Sharing Commissions - 1946-1980. The problem with 
revenue allocation in Nigeria started when the country switched from a 
Unitary Constitution to a Federal Constitution in 1946.^ With the 
adoption of the Federal Constitution, formal apportionment of centrally  
collected revenues amongst the constituent regions became necessary. 
Since then one panel a f te r  another was commissioned to make recommenda­
tions on revenue allocation between the levels o f government and among 
the units (regions/states) that form the federation.
The Phillipson Commission - 1946. This was the f i r s t  commission in 
the series. Its  recommendations were implemented in the revenue alloca­
tion scheme and used fo r four consecutive years, 1948-1952.
The Commission was asked to apply the principles of derivation, 
"even progress" and population in a llocating  declared and undeclared 
revenues. A declared revenue is one which emanates from particu lar  
a c t iv it ie s  of the people of a s ta te , whereas nondeclared revenue cannot 
be traced to the action o f the people of a state or a group of states. 
Revenue from the sale o f cash crops, e .g . ,  cocoa, is an example of a 
declared revenue. Since revenue from regional sources accrued to the 
region that produced such revenue, the Commission concerned i t s e l f  only 
with nondeclared revenue. I t  proceeded to recommend d istribution to 
regions on the basis of derivation , thereby je tt ison ing  "even progress" 
and population principles. I t  also favoured allocating revenue s t r ic t ly
^Read A. Adedeji,N igeria Federal Finance, (London, 1969), p. 221.
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on the derivation principle "as an essential condition of p o lit ic a l
tra in ing  at the regional level and as a means of tra in ing  regional
2
councils to learn to cut th e ir  coats according to th e ir  cloth."
But the Commission's recommendation was p artia l and grossly inade­
quate. Its  application of the derivation princip le was dubious. In 
computing the share of nondeclared revenue to be given to the north, 
i t  u t i l iz e d  the following equation:
A X Dr
Total Northern Region revenue = ________  + Rn,
100
(where "A" represents to ta l available nondeclared revenue, "Dr" repre­
sents regional derivation from nondeclared revenue stated in a percen­
tage, and "Rn" represents the Northern Region's own declared revenue).
But, in order to find the to ta l revenue due to any region, there 
has to be a quantitative value fo r "Dr"; otherwise we have an equation 
with two unknowns. The Commission, by fa i l in g  to indicate the formula 
or equation i t  used to derive "Dr," therefore did not succeed in its  
attempt to use the equation to solve revenue sharing problems. What 
this and other "subsequent fiscal commissions were able to do, was
3
merely to pull a formula out of th e ir  bags" and erroneously applied 
the formula in revenue allocation. That is ,  the formulae used had no 
relevance in revenue allocation process. They were used in order to 
make the work of the commissions look more professional than i t  would 
have i f  the fancy formulae were not u t i l iz e d .
The implications of the Commission's recommendations are displayed 
in the following table.
^Adedeji, op. c i t . ,  p. 57. ^ Ib id . ,  p. 55.
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Table 1
Percentage recommended 
for sharing non­
declared revenue 
1946-1947
Contribution to 
to ta l revenue in 
% ( i . e . ,  declared 
sources)
1946-1947
Percentage of recurrent 
government expenditure 
fo r regional services 
for
1946-1947
North 46 51 36
West 30 27 26
East 24 22 38
100 100 100
Source: Nigerian Federal Finance, Adedeji, p. 55.
F irs t ,  the table shows that although the north made the largest con­
tribution  to to ta l revenue (51%), i t  received only 36% of government 
expenditure in spite of i ts  large population base. The east, on the 
other hand, contributed a meagre 22% (the least) to to ta l revenue, but 
received the largest re la t iv e  government expenditure on regional bases. 
This revelation generated some conflicts among the regions and between 
the regions and the federal authority . I t  also precipitated the appoint­
ment of another commission to correct the ir re g u la r ity .
The Hicks Commission - 1952-1954. A fter the Macpherson Constitu­
tional Conference in which Nigerian leaders opted fo r greater regional 
autonomy--quasi-federal ism—the Hicks Commission was appointed to review 
the financial allocation of revenue to the regions. The Commission's 
report recommended that the regions ought to be given power to ra is e ,  
regulate and appropriate certain items of revenue.^ Its  report led
^Report of the Presidential Commission on Revenue A llocation, 
Vol. I I I .  Apapa: Federal Government Press, 1980, p. 99.
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to the emergence of the princip le of "Independent Revenue" in Nigeria 
Federal finance. Unlike its  predecessor, i t  advocated principles of 
derivation, need and national interest as bases for allocating revenue 
to regions.
The effects of the Commission's recommendations can be seen from 
the figures in Table 2, below. The figures indicate that both the 
north and the west received the l io n 's  share of the federal allocations  
during the period. These regions had budget surpluses while the east 
budgeted d e f ic its .  No wonder then that the report was not favourably 
accepted by the regions--especially the east—and this led to a fresh 
call fo r a review of the allocation system.
Table 2
Proportionate Regional Shares of Central Allocation  
and Grants, 1951-54
Percentage
1951-52
Percentage
1952-53
Percentage
1953-54
North
West
East
38.0
27.2
34.8
33.8
35.7
29.6
32.4
38.2
29.3
Source: Report, Vol. I l l ,  p. 341.
The Chicks Commission -  1953. Instead of reducing the huge
imbalance that existed between regions, the Commission exacerbated i t .  
This was partly  due to the terms of reference which the Commission was 
working with. I t  required that the panel be fu l ly  aware of "the impor­
tance of ensuring that the to ta l revenues available to Nigeria are a l lo ­
cated in such a way that the princip le of derivation is followed to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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fu l le s t  degree compatible with meeting the reasonable needs of the 
Centre and each of the regions."^ The recommendation of the Commission 
surely led to a high degree o f unequal d istribution of revenue among 
the regions. The eastern region was adversely affected by the d is t r i ­
bution while the west was favored by i t ,  as indicated in Table 3.
Table 3 
Regional Share o f Revenue
1. Original Revenue Allocation 1954-55
(North = 100) 100 123 91
2. Revised allocation based on the new 
Constitution for the second h a lf  of the 
year, starting in October 1954
(North = 100) 100 158 73
*
The north neither gained nor lost by the d is tribution .
Source: Nigeria Federal Finance, A. Adedeji, p. 107.
The system propounded by this panel put the Export Duty on produce and 
Import and Excise Duties in the hands of the regional governments. 
Moreover, i t  led to regionalization o f the National Marketing Boards. 
People c r i t ic iz e d  the Commission fo r th is . Their recommendations were 
also c r i t ic iz e d  on the following grounds:
(a) Most o f the independent revenues were l e f t  in the federal 
government's hand instead of channeling some funds to the appropriate 
regions d irec tly .
(b) The application of the princip le of derivation was defic ient  
solely because determination of regional consumption of the bulk of 
imported goods, except tobacco and processed o i l ,  was very d i f f i c u l t .
^Ibid,
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probably impossible to accomplish. I t  was d i f f i c u l t  to trace which 
goods were d ire c tly  from which area.
(c) The apparent in s en s it iv ity  to the relationship between the 
needs of a region and the region's revenue-raising a b i l i t y .  For 
example, the needs of the eastern region at this time fa r  exceeded the 
revenue alloted to th is region. These weaknesses prompted the govern­
ment to set up the Raisman Commission.
Raisman Commission - 1958. This commission was set up to carry out 
a detailed review of financial relationships between regions. Its  
recommendations were substantial in that they conferred a higher degree 
of fiscal autonomy on the regions than the previous commissions had. I t  
also established the State Joint Account, styled the Distributable Pool 
Account (DPA).*
Whereas mining rents and royalties accrued to the regions of origin  
in the previous scheme, i t  recommended that they be divided as follows: 
50% to the region of o rig in , 20% to the federal government, and 30% to 
be paid into the Distributavle Pool Account. In d is tributing  the DPA 
the Commission recommended the use of principles o f "need," "minimum 
responsib ilities" and "balanced development of the federation." I t  
advised that the Distributable Pool Account be shared as follows:
*The Distributable Pool Account (DPA) is the states' share of the 
Federation Account. I t  amounts to states' share of the d iv is ib le  taxes-- 
export, import, personal income taxes, mining rents and roya lties , i f  
any.
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Percent
North 40
East 31
West 24
Southern Cameroon  ̂ 5
100
The following table demonstrates the (p a r t ia l )  e ffe c t of the Commis­
sion's recommendations on two regional governments' budgets.
Table 4
Regional Governments' Budgets -  1962-66 
*  mi 11 ion* 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66
Western Nigeria
Recurrent Revenue 48.8 38.8 41.8 44.8
Recurrent Expenditure 49.8 38.2 42.0 48.4
Recurrent Budget
Surplus (+) D e fic it  ( - )  -1 .0  (+)0.6 -0.2 -3.6
Eastern Nigeria
Recurrent Revenue 43.4 44.9 53.4 60.0
Recurrent Expenditure 35.8 38.6 48.2 49.8
Recurrent Budget
Surplus (+) (+ )7 .6  (+ )5 .8  (+)5 .2  (+)10.2
*  #  1 is approximately $1.50.
Source: Report, Vol. I l l ,  p. 344.
For the f i r s t  time in years, the eastern region did have a surplus. The 
region was able to balance i ts  budget. On the other hand, the west
This region's share lapsed when i t  deserted the Federation in 1961 
and Midwest Region claimed one-quarter o f the share of the west when i t  
was created in 1963.
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s lig h t ly  went overboard and the region was in the red in 1962-63 and 
again between 1964 and 1966. This turn-around, although partly  due to 
the discovery of o il  in the east in 1959, also came as a result of the 
Commission's recommendation.
The Binns Commission -  1964. The Binns Fiscal Commission was
appointed to review the revenue system as part of a periodic assign­
ment on revenue allocation. I t  operated under section 164 of the Inde­
pendent Constitution and its  focus was on equitable allocation of DPA.
The Commission's work and recommendation were not s ig n if ican tly  
d iffe ren t from that of the Raisman's Commission. However, i t  recommen­
ded an increase from 30% to 35% the share of revenue in the DPA. Not 
only th a t, i t  stressed the importance of reducing inter-regional 
jealousy by the use of the princip le of "even progress." I t  recommended 
that revenue should be distributed thus:
Region Percentage
North 42
East 30
West 20
Mid-west 8
Total 1°°
The Dina Interim Revenue Allocation Committee - 1968-69. The 
Dina Committee was set up in 1968 to work out an interim allocation for  
the country. I t  was the sixth of i ts  kind but the f i r s t  committee to 
have solely Nigerians as members. The Commission recommended the estab­
lishment of a uniform income tax for the whole country and apportioned 
mining rents on in-shore operation with 15% going to the federal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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government, 5% to special grants, and 10% to the state of origin  
(Derivation) and 70% to the DPA. F in a lly , the Commission instructed  
that the financial and pricing policies of the Marketing Boards should 
be harmonized.
Since i ts  recommendations generated protests from various parts of 
the country and since i t  was also unacceptable to the states, the fed­
eral government found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to implement the Commission's recom-
7
mendations.
Decree 13 of 1970. In the heat of the protest against the Dina 
Committee, th is decree was promulgated. With the decree, the m ilita ry  
government ruled that the DPA be d istributed on the basis of population 
and equality , that is ,  50% of the pool be d istributed on equality basis 
(that is ,  50% of the DPA be distributed evenly between the states) and 
50% on population basis.
The Aboyade Technical Committee. 1977. The Aboyade Commission gave 
local government ( fo r  the f i r s t  time) a statutory share of the federal 
revenue. I t  regarded the federally  collected revenue as belonging to 
the en tire  country and, therefore, gave the federal government a fixed  
percentage share. I t  recommended the removal of the principle of d e r i­
vation from the revenue sharing system in that (according to the Com­
mittee) th is principle "had l i t t l e  or no place in a cohesive fiscal
8system for national, p o l i t ic a l  and social development." Hence, the
7
For more information on the controversy surrounding the committee's 
work, see: S.E. Oyovbaire, "The P o lit ics  o f Revenue Allocation," in 
Keith Panter-Brick (e d . ) .  Soldiers and O il:  The P o lit ica l Transforma- 
of Nigeria (London, 1978), pp. 238-243.
Q
Report of the Presidential Commission on Revenue Allocation,
Vol. I l l ,  op. c i t . , p. 375.
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Committee proposed five  c r i te r ia  for sharing revenue. These were 
( i )  Equality of access to development opportunity;
( i i )  National minimum standards fo r national integration;
( i i i )  Absorptive capacity;
( iv )  Tax e f fo r t ,  and 
(v) Fiscal e ff ic iency .
The major features o f the Committee's report were accepted by the m i l i ­
tary government, with some modifications, but i t  was declared unaccep-
g
table by the c iv i l ia n  government when i t  came to power in 1979.
The Okigbo Commission -  1980. This commission represented the 
la te s t attempt to find an acceptable formula to the revenue sharing 
feud among states. I t  was appointed immediately a fte r  the country 
returned to c iv i l ia n  rule and was chaired by the prominent Nigerian 
economist. Dr. Pius Okigbo. In addition to other terms of reference, 
the Commission was asked to consider revenue sharing c r i te r ia ,  i . e . ,  
derivation, population, national in te res t, even development equitable  
distribution  and equality of states. This assignment took the Com­
mission almost a year to fin ish  and i ts  findings and recommendations 
were published in the government's White Paper in August 1980. In the 
report, the Commission recommended that 40% of the DPA should be 
shared on the basis of population, 40% on the basis of minimum
For detailed account of the Commission's work, see Report, Vol. I ,  
p. 21; also, L.A. Rupley, "Revenue Sharing in the Nigerian Federation," 
in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 1981, pp. 
266-71.
^^The other members were Prof. A.O. P h il l ip s ,  Mr. A.A. Feese,
Alhajis B. Ismaila, U. Bello , and A. T a lib ; G.B. Leton and W.O. Ozoaga.
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re s p o n s ib il i ty --e q u a lity , 15% on primary school enrollment, and 5% on
internal revenue e f fo r t  of the s t a t e . M o r e o v e r ,  the commission
advised the federal government to transfer the responsibility fo r housing,
agriculture and Universal Primary Education to the state governments.
The Okigbo Commission's recommendations were only d if fe re n t from
those of i ts  predecessor in that the only effic iency cr ite rion  used by
the panel was the internal revenue e f fo r t .  All other c r i te r ia  were
premised on equity consideration. The Commission followed the footsteps
of the past ones in that i t  fa i le d  to a l lo t  any percentage to deriva- 
12tion in sharing the Distributable Pool Account. With some modifica­
t io n , the Commission's views were accepted by the government. Hence, the 
1981 Revenue Allocation Act was premised on the Panel's recommendations. 
No sooner had the Act been passed than some state governments, notably 
Bendel, brought su it against the federal government asking that the 
Act be declared unconstitutional, null and void. A fter a prolonged 
court ba tt le  the Act was declared void and th is led to a substantial 
modification of the Okigbo recommendation.
Presently, out of the 35% available to the states from the overall 
allocation scheme (constituting the DPA), 3.5% thereof is supposed to be 
shared on the basis o f derivation, 1% to be used fo r the amelioration of
Report of the Presidential Commission on Revenue A llocation, Vol. I ,  
Apapa: Federal Government Press, 1980, p. 101. See also: pp. 103-111
for the estimate of the revenue share for each state with the application  
of the formula devised.
^^See Ib id . ,  pp. 86-87, fo r the creation of special funds to help the 
o il producing states.
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ecological problems in any part of the country, and the rest to be d is­
tributed  according to the principles advised by the Commission.
Summary
From the overview of events that have shaped revenue sharing in 
Nigeria , i t  is apparent that the revenue allocation system has undergone 
a series o f reviews and changes over the years. So fa r  none of these 
reviews and changes has assured a mutually acceptable system of a lloca­
tion that is satisfactory to the states concerned.
Moreover, the commissions were not consistent in th e ir  recommenda­
tions. For instance, the Phillipson Commission stressed the importance 
of the principle of derivation while the Raisman and subsequent com­
missions were in favor of other principles such as continuity, minimum 
respons ib ilit ies , need, revenue e f fo r t  and balanced development.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER I I
DISTRIBUTABLE POOL ACCOUNT (DPA) AND CRITERIA FOR ALLOCATION
The Distributable Pool Account (DPA) is a great innovation in 
revenue allocation brought to Nigeria by S ir  Jeremy Raisman, who also 
recommended the same device in East A frica. In N ig e r ia , i t  was i n i t i a l l y
designed to mitigate some of the deleterious effects of the derivation
princ ip le . Over the years, however, the "Pool " has become the most 
important source of income redistribution among the states of the fed­
eration.
Between 1959 and 1966 the DPA helped increase the proportion of 
revenue that went to the regions. During th is period i t  "contributed 
an annual average of 21% of the recurrent revenue of the North, 23.7% 
of the Mid-west, and 14.1% of the East."^^ Its  contribution in the
west was small—only 11.1% per annum.
With the 1970 Decree, the government altered the make-up of the 
Account. Note that p rior to the promulgation of this Decree No. 13, 
a l l  revenues from export duties were returned to the states of origin  
of the exports. But a f te r  the Decree was passed, 2/15 of a l l  these 
export duties were distributed through the Pool. This seemingly 
t r iv ia l  a lte ra tion  was s ig n ifican t in that the government was empha­
sizing the importance of DPA as a centralized channel of revenue a l lo ­
cation system.
l^Adedeji, op. c i t . ,  p. 155.
16
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I t  is s u ff ic ie n t  to say that the revenue sharing system is now 
"largely based on the DPA and is oriented mainly towards reducing the in te r ­
state economic d isparities ,"^^  In any allocation exercise effo rts  are
made to see that the d istribution achieves the twin objectives of equity
15and e ff ic iency . But i t  is not always possible to assign equal weights to 
these two objectives. In N igeria, as in many other developing countries, 
often the tendency is to lean a l i t t l e  more on one than the other, that is ,  
to give up a l i t t l e  b it  of e ffic iency in order to placate the objective of 
equity.
The rest of this section w il l  discuss some of the red is tribu tive  prin ­
ciples^^ that have been applied to revenue sharing over time in Nigeria.
(1) Derivation
This principle stipulates that the revenue accruing from a state  
should be allocated in fu l l  to that s ta te . In plain language, this  
means that the state that generates revenue benefits d irec tly  from such 
revenue. The principle of derivation was used extensively in revenue 
sharing in the 50's but since the discovery o f o il in 1959, i t  has 
gradually been de-emphasized.
In the 50's and even 60's th is princip le was applied to the pro­
ceeds of export taxes on agricu ltural produce, thereby promoting the
^^D.G. Offensend, "Centralization and Fiscal Arrangements in Nigeria,"  
in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, (Sept. 1976), p. 510.
1^0.G. S to lz, op. c i t . ,  pp. 139-143; C.J. Goetz, What is Revenue 
Sharing, (Washington, D.C., 1972), pp. 7-14, 28, Also see: R.J. May,
Federalism and Fiscal Adjustment, (London, 1969), Ch. 6.
l^For a consideration of a l l  the c r i te r ia ,  see Report, Vol. I ,  
op. c i t . , pp. 22-31.
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cu ltivation  of export crops. I t  also encouraged the government to set 
up farms of th e ir  own as well as extend financial and technical assis­
tance to the farmers. All these led to an increase in agricultural 
productivity which in turn brought more revenue fo r the government.
A number of o il  producing states in Nigeria have argued, on equity 
grounds, fo r revenue sharing through derivation since the bulk o f  
revenue to be shared is d irec tly  or in d irec tly  from th e ir  states. These 
o il producing states are Bendel, I mo. Cross River, Rivers and Ondo,
(2) Population
The main ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r population in the revenue sharing is 
that government is about people and therefore the end of government is in 
essence the welfare o f i ts  entire  population.
The advocates of th is principle based th e ir  arguments on equity.
They postulated that true development must meet the development of man; 
and that to do this the d is tribution  of population has to be taken into  
consideration.
Moreover, the use o f population was advocated very recently by some 
states, notably Oyo state and Kano s ta te , on the basis of need. I t  was 
regarded as a reasonably good index of the need for public services in 
sta tes .
The arguments for using the population principle would have been 
plausible i f  the country had a good base fo r estimating population d is t r i ­
bution and i f  a weighted population data instead o f raw "census" were 
used.
The use of "unweighted" population was most favored by Oyo, Borno, 
Kano and Sokoto states. These states, by the way, are highly populated.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
(3) Even Development
The princip le of "even development" was f i r s t  used in the revenue
allocation in 1945 by the Phillipson commission although i t  labeled i t
"even progress" then. Subsequent commissions have called i t  d iffe ren t
names, such as "balanced development," "equal access to development
opportunities," and so on.
"Even development" is not synonymous with equal development. I t
requires only that growth and development be dispersed in order that
17"serious inequalities or imbalances are reduced in the federation."
This princip le has many serious lim ita t io n s , one of which is how to 
define the levels of development. Another is the problem of determining 
the indices o f development. F in a lly , the most important shortcoming of  
the application o f this princip le is where to find the s ta t is t ic a l  base-- 
even i f  the indices are determined—to measure the d isparities in the 
levels of development in a country l ik e  Nigeria.
(4) Need
This principle sa tis fies  both equity and effic iency objectives of 
revenue sharing. For a state or region to develop i ts  natural resources, 
fo r instance, requires that funds be allocated to i t  to carry out the 
assignment. Since the potential resources available fo r development 
d i f f e r  from one state to another, the system has to be designed to per­
mit the transfer of financial resources to the state with greater 
potential resources fo r development. This is done in order to achieve 
eff ic ien cy  in resource (funds) a llocation .
^^ Ib id .,  p. 26
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Governments of backward states have, on the other hand, used the 
"need" argument in revenue sharing to ju s t i fy  allocating more funds to 
them to raise the level of development in th e ir  states. They claimed 
that th is  adjustment is necessary on equity grounds.
The principle of need was used in revenue sharing systems f i r s t  by 
the Hicks Commission of 1952 and la te r  in the Dina Commission of 1968, 
although the report of the la t t e r  committee was never made public.
(5) Minimum National Standards
Some states in the federation have argued that Minimum National
Standards should be included in the formula used fo r revenue sharing in
Nigeria. These states asserted that minimum standards should be set for
education, agricu lture , health, and so on, with the hope of encouraging
each state to a tta in  such minimum.
Minimum National Standards as a c r ite rion  was f i r s t  introduced by
the Dina Committee in 1968. I t  has not been used in revenue sharing in
Nigeria since 1968 and i t  may never be singled out fo r use in the fo r-
seeable future. I t  is a cr ite rio n  that is appealing purely on equity 
18grounds.
(6) Absorptive Capacity
This princip le was formulated by the Aboyade Committee in 1977 to 
"represent the capacity of a state to make use of f u n d s a l l o c a t e d
^^See Report, Vol. I l l ,  loc c i t ,  p. 301, for Lagos state 's  views 
on the use o f this p rinc ip le .
l^ Report, Vol. I ,  p. 29.
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to i t .  Undoubtedly appealing on effic iency grounds, the stipulation  
here is that funds should be channeled to those states better able to 
use them.
The fear of a number of concerned individuals and o f f ic ia ls  on the 
use of th is princip le in revenue sharing is that i t  may lead to a 
widening o f the gap in the levels o f development o f d iffe ren t states. 
This is because those that are considered incapable o f using additional 
funds w il l  be starved of such funds.
Some experts have said that the usefulness of this principle is not 
in the d istribution  of the recurrent funds (DPA) but in the administra­
tion of loans, since nearly a l l  the states w il l  find ways of using any 
funds allo ted  to them. In view o f these arguments, many states do not 
support the use of th is princ ip le . A few of them that do also favor the 
"need" p rinc ip le . These two are variants o f the same princ ip le .
(7) Tax E ffo rt
In older federations the tax e f fo r t  principle has been applied in 
order to encourage states to raise th e ir  own funds in te rn a lly . This 
principle was f i r s t  in s titu ted  into the revenue allocation system in 
Nigeria by the Dina Committee and i t  was la te r  re-introduced by the 
Aboyade Technical Committee. I t  is a hybrid of the principle of inde­
pendent revenues and i t  is geared towards effic iency while being 
eq u ity -neu tra l.
A number of states such as Lagos state supported the use of this  
princip le  because of th e ir  a b i l i t y  to successfully raise funds. But 
many states have charged that the princip le  does not f i t  into the 
arena o f revenue sharing between states, that i t  gives an unfair
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advantage to a state with broad tax base. In spite of this a llegation, 
the princip le  is s t i l l  being u t i l iz e d  in the revenue sharing system 
today.
(8) Fiscal Efficiency
Fiscal e ff ic iency asserts that a state makes maximum revenue with a 
minimum cost. I t  relates to the overall e ffic iency of a state govern­
ment in i ts  administration, i ts  tax co llection , and so on.
This princip le was brought into the revenue sharing system in 1977 
and i t  s t i l l  features in the present allocation system. I t  is a p rin ­
ciple that helps keep the states on th e ir  toes with regard to revenue 
collection and expenditures.
A number of the states supported the idea that this principle  
should be introduced in the allocation system so that waste and mis­
management of funds can be prevented.
Summary
The foregoing is an attempt to describe some of the principles that 
have been employed in revenue sharing in Nigeria. Overall, these p rin ­
ciples can be divided into three d if fe re n t  groups: (a) e ff ic iency-
oriented princip les; (2) equity-oriented principles: (3) "hybrid
princip les.
Efficiency-oriented princ ip les , including tax e f fo r ts ,  absorptive 
capacity and fisca l e ff ic iency are designed to encourage states to be 
prudent in the expenditure of the funds allocated to them. Moreover, 
i t  is a device to make them generate th e ir  own funds in te rn a lly .
Equity-oriented princ ip les , on the other hand, are applied in order 
to create an atmosphere fo r even development. I t  is expected that
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purely equity principles when applied would help bridge in tersta te  d is­
parit ies  in development. This by i t s e l f  would help enhance national 
integration and unity; but also i t  would help annihilate tr iba lism , 
nepotism and many other i l l s  o f society. Population as a crite rion  in 
revenue sharing is one example of an equity-based princ ip le .
What is termed "hybrid" is the princip le used in revenue allocation  
scheme that does not fa l l  purely on the side of equity or e ff ic iency .
The princip le of "need" is an example of such.
Whatever princip le  or combination of principles is u t i l iz e d  in 
devising an allocation formula has to conform with the objectives of 
the governments, the federal government especially . The next section 
is therefore devoted to examining the objectives and goals o f the 
federal government in revenue sharing among states.
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CHAPTER I I I
INCREASED FISCAL CENTRALIZATION AND THE QUEST FOR EVEN DEVELOPMENT
Nigeria used to be a "loose" federation with very strong regional 
governments and extremely weak central authority before the Army coup 
of 1966, which resulted in the suspension of the 1960 constitution and 
the division of the regions into twelve states in May 1967. Until this  
time, only three of the more than 250 ethnic groups in the country fea­
tured in the federal p o l i t ic s .  They were the Hausas in the north, the 
Ibos in the east, and the Yorubas in the west. In short, regionalism
was the characteris tic  of the years before and immediately a f te r  inde- 
20pendence. Since the creation of states, however, the federal govern­
ment's p o lit ic a l  and economic powers have gradually increased and so has 
the quest fo r even development of the constituent parts of the nation. 
Smaller ethnic groups who now have th e ir  own states started pressuring 
the federal government to increase development opportunities in th e ir  
states and to pursue policies o f even (development) opportunities across 
the country. Apart from the above, consensus on the appropriate set of 
c r i te r ia  that would sa tis fy  the majority of states became increasingly 
d i f f i c u l t  to achieve a f te r  states were created.
Background
Before the m il ita ry  coup of 1966 there was a great imbalance in the 
development of the four regions, "with a consequential b u i l t - in  tendency
See B. Callaway, "The P o lit ic a l Economy of Nigeria" in Richard 
Harris , (e d . ) .  The P o lit ic a l Econorry of Africa (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), 
p. 112. Also see Gavin Williams and Terisa Turned, "Nigeria," in John 
Dunn (e d . ) .  West Africa States: Failure and Promise, (Cambridge, 1978), 
pp. 139-146.
24
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n  1
fo r p o l i t ic a l  in s ta b i l i ty ."  This imbalance was better reflected in the
differences in economic and social development of the regions. For
instance, whereas the north was the largest of a l l  the regions, i t  was
the least developed despite the (NPC based) federal government's attempt
to bring the region to the standard enjoyed by other regions in the coun- 
22
t ry .  To support th is assertion one should consider the educational 
situation in the north with regard to primary and secondary education. 
Whereas the percentage of children (age 6-13 years) attending primary 
school in the south (east and west) as of 1960 was extremely high, i t  was 
only 19.5% in the north. Figures on secondary education also show a s ig ­
n if ic a n t  d isparity  between the north and the south as the following table  
ind icates.
Table 5
Secondary Education (1960-63) -  Enrollment (in thousands)
North East West Lagos Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (2 ,3 ,4 )
1960 6 22 101 5 128
1961 6 25 128 7 160
1962 7 32 144 10 186
1963 9 39 150 11 200
Source; Federal M inistry of Education, S ta tis tics  of Education in N igeria , 
1963, Series No. 1, Vol. 3 (Lagos, 19657!
21L.A. Rupley, "Revenue Sharing in the Nigerian Federation," in 
Journal o f Modern African Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 1981, p. 257.
22 For more information on th is issue, see B.J. Dudley, "Federalism 
and the Balance of P o lit ic a l Power in N igeria ,"  in Journal of Commonwealth 
P o lit ic a l Studies, Vol. IV, #1, March 1966, especially pp. 22-24.
Z^Ibid.
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I t  is the d isparities  such as the one pointed out above that partly  
led to the creation of states and the rise of federal fiscal power.
Growth of Federal Financial Power
To re i te ra te ,  up until states' creation, the regions were autono­
mous. They had individual sources of revenue, apart from the steady 
income from the federal allocations. The regional based Marketing 
Boards provided regional governments with most of th e ir  revenues. They 
did this through buying and se lling  major agricultural commodities of 
each region. For example, between 1947 and 1961, the boards were sup­
posed to have "collected over ^  106 m illion ($265 m illion) in trading 
surpluses and have earned (net) a further ^ 20 m illion  ($50 m illion) on
the assets thus accumulated— they were u ltim ately used for public devel-
" 24opmental expenditures in the regions. In addition to th is ,  regional 
governments received f a i r ly  steady proportions of federal revenue. I t  
amounted to roughly about 40%, excluding loans and grants. As at 1970, 
the regional revenues equalled roughly those retained by the central 
government.
But with the division of the country into twelve states in 1967, 
and the apparent growth of national wealth a ttr ibu tab le  to increase in 
o il  production, the federal financial power grew v is -a -v is  that of the 
states. In the 1970's, the federal government retained completely the 
tax on petroleum p ro f its .  This indeed was the largest single source of 
revenue in the country. (See Table 6 fo r the increase in federal 
government share of o il  revenue.)
^^Gerald K. H e lle iner, "The Fiscal Role of the Marketing Boards in 
Nigerian Economic Development, 1947-61," The Economic Journal. Vol. 
LXXIV, (Sept. 1964). pp. 603-04.
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Table 6
Share of Oil in Total Federal Revenue - 1970-1978 (N millions)
Year Total Federal Revenue Revenue from Petroleum*
% of 
Total
1969-70 663.2 166.4 26.3
1970-71 169.0 510.2 43.6
1971-72 1,404.8 764.3 54.4
1972-73 1,695.3 1,016.0 59.9
1973-74 4,537.0 3.736.7 82.1
1974-75 5,514.7 4,271.5 77.5
Note: *Components are petroleum p ro fits  tax , mining royalties, rents,
fees, e tc .
Source: Central Bank of N igeria, Economic and Financial Review, Vol. 13,
(December, 1975), p. 81.
Also, i t  abolished the export duty on a l l  major agricultural com­
modities as of 1973; and although the states were compensated fu l ly  for  
the loss of revenue, the compensation was henceforth given out in 
unguaranteed rather than guaranteed federal funds.
In 1974 the central government moved one step further in trimming 
the state governments' revenue. I t  abolished the produce sales tax, 
thus enlarging the incomes of the farmers as was the case with the 
abolition o f the export duty.
To compensate for th e ir  actions the central authority financed 
many states ' programmes, especially in the areas of health, education, 
and highway construction. I t  took d irec t control o f the entire regional/ 
state marketing board system in 1973, in order to ensure maximum cen­
t ra l  authority over the all- im portant agricultural sector. F ina lly , i t  
planned the in s titu t io n  of a uniform personal income tax.
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Effect of Fiscal Centralization
The growth of the federal financial power which started with the 
reform of 1967 was designed not only to reduce the strength of states 
so that they henceforth cease to pose threats to the physical existence 
of the nation as a u n it, but also to bring a more equitable d is tr ibu ­
tion in revenue allocation among them.
Starting from 1967 the percentage increases in total recurrent rev­
enue allocated to the states have been increasing, as Table 7, below, 
indicates. Not only th a t,  revenue sources of the states have changed 
with more funds coming from the center than the states can mobilize 
in te rn a lly .  Again, th is is demonstrated in the second table following.
Table 7
Percentage Increases in Federal Recurrent Appropriations
PercentYear
to State Governments 1969-77
Amount
m illion
1968-69 86.5 100
1969-70 164.1 190
1970-71 302.0 349
1971-72 334.2 386
1972-73 312.4 361
1973-74* 331.5 383
1974-75* 589.9 682
1975-76 1,053.6 1,218
1976-77 1,361.7 1.584
Note: *Estimates
Source: Computed from Digest o f S ta t is t ic s , Lagos, Vol. 24, (Jan., 1975),
Federal Government Approved Estimates, Federal Ministry of Information, 
(1973-74 to 1976-77).
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Table 8
Composition of State Government's Revenue: 1968-75 (W: m illion)  
Total
Year Amount Federal Source Internal Source
Amount % Amount %
1968-69 144.5 86.5 60 58.0 40
1969-70 232.2 164.1 70 68.1 30
1970-71 393.0 302.0 77 90.0 23
1971-72 454.1 334.2 73 119.8 27
1972-73 545.8 312.4 67 142.3 33
1973-74* 525.8 331.4 63 194.4 37
1974-75* 839.6 589.9 72 249.7 28
Note: ^Estimates
Source: Digest of S ta t is t ic s , Lagos, Vol. 24 (January 1975), p. 81, and 
Approved Estimates of the State Governments, 1973-74 and 1974-75.
Federal Ministry of Finance, Lagos.
Another e ffe c t of centralization was the withdrawal from heavy use
of the principle of derivation in the a llocation . The obvious losers in
this case are the o il producing states and the "greatest beneficiaries of
25the new system of allocation were the more populous states." The im pli­
cation of the federal action was that i t  increased the competition for  
federal funds among the states and th is in turn promoted the controversy 
on the appropriate revenue sharing formula for d istributing the revenue.
25S.E. Oyovbaire, op. c i t . ,  p. 238.
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CHAPTER IV 
REVENUE SHARING FORMULA -  AN ALBATROSS
The f i r s t  two chapters of this paper have reviewed the works of d i f f e r ­
ent commissions and also the c r i te r ia  used in past a llocation. This chap­
te r  w i l l  analyze why the debate cannot be resolved and make some recommen­
dations regarding improvements in N igeria 's revenue sharing polic ies.
Up to th is point the issue of revenue sharing among states has been 
handled as i f  the only income available to a state is the allocation from
the federal government. This is fa r  from being true. States derive th e ir
revenue from the private and the public sectors. Hence, an improvement 
in a s ta te 's  economy can be a ttr ibu tab le  to the effo rts  of the public 
as well as the private sector of that s ta te . The private sector especi­
a l ly  can (and often does) partic ipate  in the development of a state.
The controversy being talked about in this paper relates to the f i s ­
cal needs of a state government. I t  is the fiscal needs that would
"enable the state government to perform its  role in the development of 
the s ta te 's  economy."
Moreover, for the performance of i ts  tasks, a state government has more 
than one avenue of acquiring funds. Apart from the fact that i t  can bor­
row money from external sources, i t  obtains recurrent revenues from these 
sources: (a) internal revenue, (b) non-statutory grants, (c) statutory  
revenue. Total revenue acquired by the states through these three sources 
are displayed on the following pages.
Internal Revenue
As the figures below show, the internal revenue of the states grew
by 53.7% between 1976-77 and 1979-80 from # 0 .4 1  b i l l io n  ($.82) 
b i l l io n )  to #  0.63 ($1.26 b i l l io n ) .  These figures are
^^Report, Vol. IV, p. 15.
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Table 9 
State Governments 1976-80^7
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(ttr b i l 1 ion )*
1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80
Statutory Revenue 1.45 1.79 1.64 3.14
Non-statutory 1.22 1.39 1.23 1.45
Internal Revenue 0.41 0.46 0.52 0.63
3.08 3.74 3.39 5.22
*Note: #  1 is approximately $2.
impressive. What is not known, however, is the shrinkage of the states' 
internal base (figures are not available now) due to federal encroach­
ment. This w il l  be expanded upon in the next paragraphs.
Recall that the federal government took over the marketing boards in
1973, thereby diverting the incomes of these regional corporations 
(exploited previously by the governments of the regions, la te r  states, 
fo r  revenue purposes) to th e ir  purse. Also, i t  centralized, by in s t i tu ­
ting  the Uniform Tax Decree No. 7 of 1975, the income tax—thereby
cu rta ilin g  the e ffo rts  of individual states that want to charge d iffe ren ­
t i a l  rates to increase th e ir  own internal sources.
As i f  these were not enough, the federal authority confiscated 
some revenue-yielding properties of the states. A modest estimate of
such properties in Oyo state was valued at over $250 m il l i on 28
^^See Report, Vol. I ,  p. 73. 
^^Report, Vol. I l l ,  p. 353.
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F in a lly ,  one source of income fo r the states in the northern part of
29the country—the Jangali—was completely abolished.
Although many states were hurt by these actions they were not
30d ire c t ly  compensated except probably through non-statutory grants.
Non-Statutory Revenue
This includes the discretionary unconditional grants to the state
governments. Included here also are " th e ir  shares of export duties on
animals, birds and re p t i le s ,  as well as th e ir  subsidies for the federal
abolition or control of revenue sources, such as export duties on produce,
31produce-sales tax, and the uniform personal income tax."
Since 1968 there has been an increase in the volume of grants a l lo ­
cated to the states by the federal government. For instance, in 1974-75 
f iscal year the states received about $500 m illion as opposed to $24 
m illion  a llo tte d  to a l l  the regions between 1962 and 1968.
But although additional funds are made available to the states via 
these grants, non-statutory revenue allocations are irregular in the dis­
bursements, fu l l  of vagaries in th e ir  timing and frequency, and highly 
susceptible to changes in federal government's p r io r i t ie s .  Hence, they 
are unreliab le .
^^Jangali is a c a tt le  tax and i t  is one of the major sources of 
revenue of governments in the northern and "middle-belt" states.
Report , Vol. I l l ,  p. 353.
^^L.A. Rupley, op. c i t . ,  p. 273.
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3?statutory Revenue
These are allocations that the federal government is required by law 
to make to the states. They are unconditional since the donor, i . e . ,  
central authority , does not decide how the funds ought to be spent and the 
recip ient is not required to match them.
In Nigeria, the system of statutory allocations to the state govern­
ment is embodied in the Constitution and is basically distributed through 
the states' Joint Account corresponding to the Distributable Pool Account.
As Table 9 (page 31) i l lu s t ra te s ,  the revenue represents over 60% 
of the tota l revenue of a l l  the states in 1979-80. I f  the trend of increa­
sing federal intrusion on states' internal sources of revenue continues
in the future the way i t  has in the past, and i f  the grants allocation
33system is scrapped as a number of states—notably Ondo sta te— has sug­
gested, th is source may become the only real source of revenue for the 
states. This, coupled with the fact that states' to ta l (capital and 
recurrent) expenditures^^ have increased over the years, makes the plan 
(formula) for allocating revenue in the O.P.A. or S .J .A ., an extremely 
sensitive issue.
^^For elaboration on the use o f statutory allocation as a general 
revenue transfer, see May, op. c i t . ,  p. 164.
^^Report, Vol. I l l ,  p. 336.
^^States ' to ta l expenditure grew from about # 4 . 3  b il l io n  in 
1976-77 to about #  5.9 b i l l io n  in 1979-80.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
34
No wonder then that states have never agreed on the formula for 
d is tr ibu ting  th is account. So fa r ,  the formulae applied while making 
some states/regions better o f f  have always made others worse o ff .  There 
is l i t t l e  doubt that revenue allocation system between 1948 and 1959 
benefited the north and the western regions because these two regions 
cap ita lized  on the derivation princip le through the sale of the regions' 
cash crops—p rin c ip a lly  cocoa and groundnuts. The east prospered from 
the application of the same princip le in the revenue allocation system 
between 1959 and 1966 when o il  replaced the cash crops as the main com­
modity that brought wealth to the country.
Moreover, a number of states benefited from the m ilita ry  govern­
ment's Decree 13 of 1970 which ruled that the DPA be shared 50/50 on 
equality and population bases only. The more populated and fa i r ly  
developed states gained at the expense of the sparsely populated and 
backward states.
Formula fo r Allocation
One can hardly be surprised that revenue sharing among the 
Nigerian states generates a lo t  of heat and controversy when one rea­
lizes  that "the resultant revenue going to each unit considerably affects ,  
i f  not determines, the rate o f economic development that can be achieved 
in the units . Moreover, the level of economic development relates  
(assuming e ffic iency) to the level of expenditures in the state. Since 
Internal sources of revenue generation are lim ited fo r states in the
Report, Vol. I l l ,  p. 451
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country, i t  follows then that a state has to look to federal sources 
fo r  i ts  revenue.
But a s ta te 's  share of the source(s) depends on what formula is 
used to d is tribu te  the statutory a llocation. I t  follows, therefore, 
that a state has to be sensitive to the formula used fo r this allocation.
The foregoing relationships are depicted in the following flow charts
REVENUE ALLOCATION 
FORMULA (dictates the amount o f^ ^
REVENUE RECEIVED BY 
THE STATE GOVERNMENTS 
FROM FEDERAL SOURCES
STATE GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURE
(essential ly  
is)
4 r
(determines) STATE GOVERNMENT 
REVENUE
There are two points of contention as regards the appropriate fo r ­
mula fo r a llocating revenue among the states. F irst is the principles to 
be used. The principles are the rules to be applied, the basis or gen­
eral law to guide or to be applied in the allocation process. Second is 
the weights attached to these princip les. Assigned weights are as impor­
tant as the principles used in the revenue sharing system in that they 
d ictate  how the DPA is supposed to be shared between the states. The 
principles applied, coupled with the weights, together is what is reffered  
to as the formula fo r revenue allocation .
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Ofr
I f  we can accept R.J. May's judgment that the grantor of statutory  
revenue has no business regarding how funds are spent by the units, then 
we can conclude that the federal government does not have to be te r r ib ly  
concerned with the effic iency side of the d istribution but, more impor­
ta n t ly ,  with the equity side. Its  job in revenue allocation should there­
fore be to make sure that the revenue is equitably distributed so as to 
make i t  p o l i t ic a l ly  acceptable.
An examination of the formulae applied in the past supports this  
suggestion. With the exception of the Aboyade Commission^^ of 1977, the 
other commissions' recommendations might have given very minimum portions 
of the allocation to d is tribution  on an effic iency principle just to 
sweeten the pot. For example, the las t commission, (Okigbo, 1980), did 
exactly th is  when i t  assigned only 5% to internal revenue e f fo r t .
In general, equity and e ffic iency should guide revenue sharing, but 
in the Nigerian situation where e ffo rts  are constantly being directed at 
bridging inter-regional gaps and at achieving national integration and 
unity among the parts, there is a great need for statutory revenue to be 
allocated using equity-oriented princip les. An examination of the prin ­
ciples applied in the formulae so fa r  does not suggest otherwise.
From the Phillipson Commission of 1948 up to the Hicks (1952), the 
emphases were on derivation , even progress and national in te rest. When 
"fiscal autonomy" was introduced by the Chick Commission in 1955, i t  was
36See R.J. May, op. c i t . ,  p. 164.
37 Note that i ts  recommendations were declared invalid  and unaccep­
table to the states.
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not because of e ffic iency  but rather in the interest o f equity. This was 
the only s ign ifican t additional princip le to the revenue sharing system 
between 1955 and 1967. From 1967 up until 1975 the only s ignificant  
change was the introduction of the "tax e ffo r t"  princip le .
The foregoing discussion apart, between 1975 and 1980, three prin ­
ciples were used to allocate statutory revenue among state governments. 
These were; population, equality  and derivation. I t  appeared that d i f ­
ferent states re lied  on and benefited from one or the other of these 
princip les. The following table shows the princip le(s) that each 
state benefited from.
Table 10
Derivation Equality Population
Bendel Banchi Anambara
Ri vers Benue Borno
Gongola Cross River
Kwara Imo*
Lagos Kuduna
Nigeria Kano
Ogun Oyo
Ondo* Sokoto
Plateau
*  These states w il l  now benefit more from derivation due to o il d is­
coveries within th e ir  boundaries.
Source: Condensed from Report, Vol. IV, p. 22 (Table 1)
A comparative impact of the use of these three principles for year X is 
shown in the following simulated exercise.
38
See Report, Vol. IV, op. c i t . ,  pp. 20-22, and also Report, Vol. I 
op. c i t . ,  p. 91.
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While the more populated states such as Oyo and Kano might appreciate 
the use of population in revenue sharing, o il producing states such as 
Rivers and Bendel would advocate increased use of the derivation prin­
c ip le , and the sparsely populated cum non-oil producing states would seek 
refuge under minimum responsib ility  (equality) princip le . The present 
c iv i l ia n  government seemed to have recognized the indispensability of 
these principles when i t  modified the revenue allocation formula (based 
on Okigbo's recommendation) by including the derivation principle with
39the principles o f population and equality  which were already in vogue.
With reference to the assignment of weights to princip les, there is ,
unfortunately, no easy prescription. Such assignment would require heavy 
s ta t is t ic a l  computations involving the use of data on (accurate) census, 
population d is tribution  (according to age, sex, e t c . ) ,  income d is tr ibu ­
tion and other socio-economic indicators. But, there is a paucity of 
such data in Nigeria at this time.
^^See Federal Republic of Nigeria: Allocation of Revenue B i l l ,  1981, 
(Dec. 1981), p. 3.
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CONCLUSION
Nigeria s t i l l  has quite some way to go in its  revenue sharing system 
in order to be able to f in a l ly  arrive at a formula for allocation that 
w il l  sa tis fy  the states. I t  is distressing to note that the previous 
Review Committees have not been successful in solving the knotty issues 
of revenue sharing. This is largely because they often fa iled  to realize  
that revenue sharing among states is only marginally economic and prin ­
c ip a lly  a matter p o lit ic a l  compromise. The Federal Republic of Nigeria is 
comprised of many ethnic groups who put e th n ic /tr ib a l considerations over 
considerations of equity with respect to revenue sharing. This creates 
conflic ts  as regards how revenue is to be equitably distributed. These 
types of c o n flic ts , on the other hand, make compromise d i f f ic u l t  and the 
principles o f equity and effic iency d i f f ic u l t  to translate into policies. 
Another reason for the fa i lu re  of the commissions is that they frequently 
work with data which nobody has fa ith  in because they are outdated and 
therefore unreliable . The population data which relies on 1963 census 
figures is a perfect example of such data.
The establishment of a permanent independent finance commission is 
long overdue fo r the country.^^ Such an independent commission should 
have a secretaria t where i t  would be involved in research and make 
recommendations on a biennial b a s i s ,  on allocations of shared revenues
^^The establishment of a permanent review commission was recom­
mended by the Dina, Aboyade and Okigbo Commissions.
40
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between the federal government and the governments of states and also 
among state governments.
F in a lly , deliberate e ffo rts  are needed on the part of state govern­
ments to rea lize  that revenue needs o f other states are just as pressing 
as th e ir  own. "To see beyond narrow, sectional interests to the neces­
s ity  fo r a nation that is more than merely a grouping of 19 states is a 
formidable challenge i n d e e d , b u t  i t  is n 't  an impossible one.
^^L.A. Rupley, op. c i t . ,  pp. 276-77.
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